• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide).

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea ice is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009, Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010), and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide).

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea ice is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009, Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010), and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide)

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea ice is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009, Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010) and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide)

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea ice is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009; Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010) and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide)

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea ice is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009; Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010) and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide)

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea ice is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009; Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010) and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide)

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea ice is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009; Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010) and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export will contribute to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide)

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009; Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010) and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

• Arctic sea ice is naturally exported through the Fram Strait and to a lesser extent Nares Strait and other straits in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Increased sea ice export will contribute to a decline in Arctic sea ice, and decreased export to more and thicker sea ice remaining in the Arctic (Smedsrud et al. 2008). In this approach, strategically placed barriers, or reinforcement of natural barriers, such as ice arches or bridges, may block ice export. In Nares Strait, sea ice export has been naturally blocked by ice arches. These arches have weakened over time due to climate change (Vincent 2019, Moore et al. 2023). Strengthening ice arches may reinforce blocking of sea ice export, increasing sea ice concentration, thickness, and albedo (Moore et al. 2023). About 10% of the Arctic sea ice area is exported every year (Smedsrud et al. 2017) with around 900,000 km² of ice transported through the Fram Strait, 100,000 km² of ice transported through Nares Strait, and around 50,000 km² of ice transported through parts of the Canadian Archipelago (F. Ypma pers. comm.). In theory, some of this ice could be prevented from melting in the warmer areas further south.

• Expected physical changes (Arctic region)
  • Prevent ice export

• Targeted at Fram Strait on western part of Fram Strait near Greenland (approximately 150 km wide) or in Nares Strait (approximately 25 km wide)

• Sea surface

• Targeted areas within the Arctic region where sea is exported; Fram and Nares Straits.
  • The Fram Strait is 2600 m deep, 580 km wide (Haine et al. 2015). Ice is predominantly exported in the western part of the Fram Strait in the East Greenland Current (Kwok 2009; Smedsrud et al. 2017). Most sea ice export occurs in the Fram Strait. Nares Strait is much narrower, approximately 30-40 km wide (Kwok et al. 2010) and would be a potential area to test before the Fram Strait, or as a site to reinforce natural ice arches.

• All year. Export is largest during winter due to stronger winds.

Impact on

• Unknown
  • Potential increase of up to 0.78 comparing areas without and with ice.
    • Accumulation of ice in ice-free areas could increase albedo locally from 0.07 (open water; Perovich and Polashenski 2012) to approximately 0.85 (ice with snow; Perovich and Polashenski 2012).
    • However, ice does not necessarily melt as it is normally transported to more southern latitudes. Therefore, there may be albedo loss from preventing ice to be transported south, or the albedo might not change.

• Global
  • Unknown, unlikely to have an impact, may have small cooling potential.
• Arctic region
  • Unknown, moderate cooling potential.

• Global
  • Likely small.
• Arctic region
  • Likely larger than the global impact (likely similar to ice thickening).

• Direct or indirect impact on sea ice?
  • Direct impact on sea ice
    • Would directly block export of sea ice from targeted areas in the Arctic. Blocking ice export would lead to accumulation of ice which may increase formation of new ice between existing pieces of ice. This could locally increase sea ice extent/area.
• New or old ice?
  • Both
• Impact on sea ice
  • Increased Arctic sea ice concentration and thickness
    • For Nares Strait, when a southern ice arch is present, sea ice thickness and concentration increase within Nares Strait (Moore et al. 2023).
    • Simulations of the Fram Strait with reduced ice export lead to increased sea ice thickness and concentration (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
    • In theory, blocking Nares Strait would avoid 100,000 km² of ice outflow as a net impact. This is equal to the yearly net decline of summer sea ice currently and could potentially stabilize ice cover.

Scalability

• Spatial scalability not required
  • This approach could only work in two places, Nares and Fram Straits. However, that also is a potential value of this approach, only needing to do engineering in a relatively small targeted area to have an effect on a larger area.
  • This approach could in theory first be tested in the narrower Nares Strait, then attempted for the Fram Strait. Modeling studies could speak to potential of scaling up to Fram Strait.

• Unknown

• Unknown
  • • Need to do modeling study, then try in Nares Strait if looks possible

• Unknown, but unlikely to have global impact

• Unknown

Cost

• Unknown
  • Would depend on the materials used to create the blocking mechanism, costs of deployment, and maintenance.

• • Unknown
    • Would depend on the materials used to create the blocking mechanism and on deployment and maintenance mechanisms and infrastructure.

Impact on

• Unknown
  • Potential increase of up to 0.78 comparing areas without and with ice.
    • Accumulation of ice in ice-free areas could increase albedo locally from 0.07 (open water; Perovich and Polashenski 2012) to approximately 0.85 (ice with snow; Perovich and Polashenski 2012).
    • However, ice does not necessarily melt as it is normally transported to more southern latitudes. Therefore, there may be albedo loss from preventing ice to be transported south, or the albedo might not change.

• Global
  • Unknown, unlikely to have an impact, may have small cooling potential.
• Arctic region
  • Unknown, moderate cooling potential.

• Global
  • Likely small
• Arctic region
  • Likely larger than the global impact (likely similar to ice thickening)

• Direct or indirect impact on sea ice?
  • Direct impact on sea ice
    • Would directly block export of sea ice from targeted areas in the Arctic. Blocking ice export would lead to accumulation of ice which may increase formation of new ice between existing pieces of ice. This could locally increase sea ice extent/area.
• New or old ice?
  • Both
• Impact on sea ice
  • Increased Arctic sea ice concentration and thickness
    • For Nares Strait, when a southern ice arch is present, sea ice thickness and concentration increase within Nares Strait (Moore et al. 2023).
    • Simulations of the Fram Strait with reduced ice export lead to increased sea ice thickness and concentration (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
    • In theory, blocking Nares Strait would avoid 100,000 km² of ice outflow as a net impact. This is equal to the yearly net decline of summer sea ice currently and could potentially stabilize ice cover.

Scalability

• Spatial scalability not required
  • This approach could only work in two places, Nares and Fram Straits. However, that also is a potential value of this approach, only needing to do engineering in a relatively small targeted area to have an effect on a larger area.
  • This approach could in theory first be tested in the narrower Nares Strait, then attempted for the Fram Strait. Modeling studies could speak to potential of scaling up to Fram Strait.

• Unknown

• Unknown
  • • Need to do modeling study, then try in Nares Strait if looks possible

• Unknown, but unlikely to have global impact

• Unknown

Cost

• Unknown
  • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism, costs of deployment, and maintenance

• • Unknown
    • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism and on deployment and maintenance mechanisms and infrastructure

Impact on

• Unknown
  • Potential increase of up to 0.78 comparing areas without and with ice.
    • Accumulation of ice in ice-free areas could increase albedo locally from 0.07 (open water; Perovich and Polashenski 2012) to approximately 0.85 (ice with snow; Perovich and Polashenski 2012).
    • However, ice does not necessarily melt as it is normally transported to more southern latitudes. Therefore, there may be albedo loss from preventing ice to be transported south, or the albedo might not change.

• Global
  • Unknown, unlikely to have an impact, may have small cooling potential.
• Arctic region
  • Unknown, moderate cooling potential.

• Global
  • Likely small
• Arctic region
  • Likely larger than the global impact (likely similar to ice thickening)

• Direct or indirect impact on sea ice?
  • Direct impact on sea ice
    • Would directly block export of sea ice from targeted areas in the Arctic. Blocking ice export would lead to accumulation of ice which may increase formation of new ice between existing pieces of ice. This could locally increase sea ice extent/area.
• New or old ice?
  • Both
• Impact on sea ice
  • Increased Arctic sea ice concentration and thickness
    • For Nares Strait, when a southern ice arch is present, sea ice thickness and concentration increase within Nares Strait (Moore et al. 2023).
    • Simulations of the Fram Strait with reduced ice export lead to increased sea ice thickness and concentration (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
    • In theory, blocking Nares Strait would avoid 100,000 km² of ice outflow as a net impact. This is equal to the yearly net decline of summer sea ice currently and could potentially stabilize ice cover.

Scalability

• Spatial scalability not required
  • This approach could only work in two places, Nares and Fram Straits. However, that also is a potential value of this approach, only needing to do engineering in a relatively small targeted area to have an effect on a larger area.
  • This approach could in theory first be tested in the narrower Nares Strait, then attempted for the Fram Strait. Modeling studies could speak to potential of scaling up to Fram Strait.

• Unknown

• Unknown
  • • Need to do modeling study, then try in Nares Strait if looks possible

• Unknown, but unlikely to have global impact

• Unknown

Cost

• Unknown
  • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism, costs of deployment, and maintenance

• • Unknown
    • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism and on deployment and maintenance mechanisms and infrastructure

Impact on

• Unknown
  • Potential increase of up to 0.78 comparing areas without and with ice.
    • Accumulation of ice in ice-free areas could increase albedo locally from 0.07 (open water; Perovich and Polashenski 2012) to approximately 0.85 (ice with snow; Perovich and Polashenski 2012).
    • However, ice does not necessarily melt as it is normally transported to more southern latitudes. Therefore, there may be albedo loss from preventing ice to be transported south, or the albedo might not change.

• Global
  • Unknown, unlikely to have an impact, may have small cooling potential.
• Arctic region
  • Unknown, moderate cooling potential.

• Global
  • Likely small
• Arctic region
  • Likely larger than the global impact (likely similar to ice thickening)

• Direct or indirect impact on sea ice?
  • Direct impact on sea ice
    • Would directly block export of sea ice from targeted areas in the Arctic. Blocking ice export would lead to accumulation of ice which may increase formation of new ice between existing pieces of ice. This could locally increase sea ice extent/area.
  • New or old ice?
    • Both
• Impact on sea ice
  • Increased Arctic sea ice concentration and thickness
    • For Nares Strait, when a southern ice arch is present, sea ice thickness and concentration increase within Nares Strait (Moore et al. 2023).
    • Simulations of the Fram Strait with reduced ice export lead to increased sea ice thickness and concentration (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
    • In theory, blocking Nares Strait would avoid 100,000 km² of ice outflow as a net impact. This is equal to the yearly net decline of summer sea ice currently and could potentially stabilize ice cover.

Scalability

• Spatial scalability not required
  • This approach could only work in two places, Nares and Fram Straits. However, that also is a potential value of this approach, only needing to do engineering in a relatively small targeted area to have an effect on a larger area.
  • This approach could in theory first be tested in the narrower Nares Strait, then attempted for the Fram Strait. Modeling studies could speak to potential of scaling up to Fram Strait.

• Unknown

• Unknown
  • • Need to do modeling study, then try in Nares Strait if looks possible

• Unknown, but unlikely to have global impact

• Unknown

Cost

• Unknown
  • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism, costs of deployment, and maintenance

• • Unknown
    • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism and on deployment and maintenance mechanisms and infrastructure

Impact on

• Unknown
  • Potential increase of up to 0.78 comparing areas without and with ice.
    • Accumulation of ice in ice-free areas could increase albedo locally from 0.07 (open water; Perovich and Polashenski 2012) to approximately 0.85 (ice with snow; Perovich and Polashenski 2012).
    • However, as ice is normally transported to more southern latitudes, it does not necessarily melt. Therefore, there may be albedo loss from preventing ice to be transported south, or the albedo might not change.

• Global
  • Unknown, unlikely to have an impact, may have small cooling potential.
• Arctic region
  • Unknown, moderate cooling potential.

• Global
  • Likely small
• Arctic region
  • Likely larger than the global impact (likely similar to ice thickening)

• Direct or indirect impact on sea ice?
  • Direct impact on sea ice
    • Would directly block export of sea ice from targeted areas in the Arctic. Blocking ice export would lead to accumulation of ice which may increase formation of new ice between existing pieces of ice. This could locally increase sea ice extent/area.
  • New or old ice?
    • Both
• Impact on sea ice
  • Increased Arctic sea ice concentration and thickness
    • For Nares Strait, when a southern ice arch is present, sea ice thickness and concentration increase within Nares Strait (Moore et al. 2023).
    • Simulations of the Fram Strait with reduced ice export lead to increased sea ice thickness and concentration (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
    • In theory, blocking Nares Strait would avoid 100,000 km² of ice outflow as a net impact. This is equal to the yearly net decline of summer sea ice currently and could potentially stabilize ice cover.

Scalability

• Spatial scalability not required
  • This approach could only work in two places, Nares and Fram Straits. However, that also is a potential value of this approach, only needing to do engineering in a relatively small targeted area to have an effect on a larger area.
  • This approach could in theory first be tested in the narrower Nares Strait, then attempted for the Fram Strait. Modeling studies could speak to potential of scaling up to Fram Strait.

• Unknown

• Unknown
  • • Need to do modeling study, then try in Nares Strait if looks possible

• Unknown, but unlikely to have global impact

• Unknown

Cost

• Unknown
  • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism, costs of deployment, and maintenance

• • Unknown
    • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism and on deployment and maintenance mechanisms and infrastructure

Impact on

• Unknown
  • Potential increase of up to 0.78 comparing areas without and with ice.
    • Accumulation of ice in ice-free areas could increase albedo locally from 0.07 (open water; Perovich and Polashenski 2012) to approximately 0.85 (ice with snow; Perovich and Polashenski 2012).
    • However, as ice is normally transported to more southern latitudes, it does not necessarily melt, so there may be albedo loss from preventing ice to be transported south or the albedo might not change.

• Global
  • Unknown, unlikely to have an impact, may have small cooling potential.
• Arctic region
  • Unknown, moderate cooling potential.

• Global
  • Likely small
• Arctic region
  • Likely larger than the global impact (likely similar to ice thickening)

• Direct or indirect impact on sea ice?
  • Direct impact on sea ice
    • Would directly block export of sea ice from targeted areas in the Arctic. Blocking ice export would lead to accumulation of ice which may increase formation of new ice between existing pieces of ice. This could locally increase sea ice extent/area.
  • New or old ice?
    • Both
• Impact on sea ice
  • Increased Arctic sea ice concentration and thickness
    • For Nares Strait, when a southern ice arch is present, sea ice thickness and concentration increase within Nares Strait (Moore et al. 2023).
    • Simulations of the Fram Strait with reduced ice export lead to increased sea ice thickness and concentration (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
    • In theory, blocking Nares Strait would avoid 100,000 km² of ice outflow as a net impact. This is equal to the yearly net decline of summer sea ice currently and could potentially stabilize ice cover.

Scalability

• Spatial scalability not required
  • This approach could only work in two places, Nares and Fram Strait. However, that also is a potential value of this approach, only needing to do engineering in a relatively small targeted area to have an effect on a larger area.
  • This approach could in theory first be tested in the narrower Nares Strait, then attempted for the Fram Strait. Modeling studies could speak to potential of scaling up to Fram Strait.

• Unknown

• Unknown
  • • Need to do modeling study, then try in Nares Strait if looks possible

• Unknown, but unlikely to have global impact

• Unknown

Cost

• Unknown
  • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism, costs of deployment, and maintenance

• • Unknown
    • Would depend on materials used to create blocking mechanism, deployment and maintenance mechanisms and infrastructure

• 2 – Some models about responses to preventing sea ice export, some technology available to thicken ice
• Summary of existing literature and studies:
  • Modeling studies of reduced ice export (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
  • Technologies could build off of other ideas proposed for geoengineering glaciers by blocking warm water flow with seabed curtains or buttressing ice sheets (Lockley et al. 2020, Moore et al. 2018).
  • For strengthening ice arches, ice thickening technologies already exist and have been in use in the oil and gas industry (F. Ypma, pers. comm.).

• Feasible
  • Field test within 10 yrs is technically feasible
    • Materials and infrastructure required likely already exist.

• 2 – Some models about responses to preventing sea ice export, some technology available to thicken ice
• Summary of existing literature and studies:
  • Modeling studies of reduced ice export (Smedsrud et al. 2008).
  • Technologies could build off of other ideas proposed for geoengineering glaciers by blocking warm water flow with seabed curtains or buttressing ice sheets (Lockley et al. 2020, Moore et al. 2018).
  • For strengthening ice arches, ice thickening technologies already exist and have been in use in the oil and gas industry (F. Ypma, pers. comm.).

• Yes
  • Field test within 10 yrs is technically feasible
    • Materials and infrastructure required likely already exist.

• 2 – Some models about responses to preventing sea ice export, some technology available to thicken ice
• Summary of existing literature and studies:
  • Modeling studies of reduced ice export (Smedsrud et al. 2008)
  • Technologies could build off of other ideas proposed for geoengineering glaciers by blocking warm water flow with seabed curtains or buttressing ice sheets (Lockley et al. 2020, Moore et al. 2018).
  • For strengthening ice arches, ice thickening technologies already exist and have been in use in the oil and gas industry (F. Ypma, pers. comm.).

• Yes
  • Field test within 10 yrs is technically feasible
    • Materials and infrastructure required likely already exist.

• 2 – Some models about responses to preventing sea ice export, some technology available to thicken ice
• Summary of existing literature and studies:
  • Modeling studies of reduced ice export (Smedsrud et al. 2008)
  • Technologies could build off of other ideas proposed for geoengineering glaciers by blocking warm water flow with seabed curtains or buttressing ice sheets (Lockley et al. 2020, Moore et al. 2018).
  • For strengthening ice arches, ice thickening technologies already exist and have been in use in the oil and gas industry (F. Ypma, pers. comm.).

• Yes
  • Field test within 10 yrs is technically feasible
    • Materials and infrastructure required likely already exist.

• • 2 – Some models about responses to preventing sea ice export, some technology available to thicken ice
  • Summary of existing literature and studies:
    • Modeling studies of reduced ice export (Smedsrud et al. 2008)
    • Technologies could build off of other ideas proposed for geoengineering glaciers by blocking warm water flow with seabed curtains or buttressing ice sheets (Lockley et al. 2020, Moore et al. 2018).
    • For strengthening ice arches, ice thickening technologies already exist and have been in use in the oil and gas industry (F. Ypma, pers. comm.).

• • Yes
    • Field test within 10 yrs is technically feasible
      • Materials and infrastructure required likely already exist.

• TRL
  • 2 – Some models about responses to preventing sea ice export, some technology available to thicken ice
  • Summary of existing literature and studies:
    • Modeling studies of reduced ice export (Smedsrud et al. 2008)
    • Technologies could build off of other ideas proposed for geoengineering glaciers by blocking warm water flow with seabed curtains or buttressing ice sheets (Lockley et al. 2020, Moore et al. 2018).
    • For strengthening ice arches, ice thickening technologies already exist and have been in use in the oil and gas industry (F. Ypma, pers. comm.).
• Technical feasibility within 10 yrs
  • Yes
    • Field test within 10 yrs is technically feasible
      • Materials and infrastructure required likely already exist.

Physical and chemical changes

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice.
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate.

Impacts on species

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on ecosystems

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations" below).
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is near Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations" below). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on society

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait).
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

Ease of reversibility

• Medium
  • Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used.

Risk of termination shock

• Medium
  • A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
    • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

Physical and chemical changes

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice.
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate.

Impacts on species

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on ecosystems

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations" below). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on society

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait).
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

Ease of reversibility

• Medium
  • Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used.

Risk of termination shock

• Medium
  • A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
    • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

Physical and chemical changes

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice.
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate.

Impacts on species

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on ecosystems

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations"). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on society

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait).
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

Ease of reversibility

• Medium
  • Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used.

Risk of termination shock

• Medium
  • A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
    • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

Physical and chemical changes

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice.
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate.

Impacts on species

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on ecosystems

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations"). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on society

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait).
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

Ease of reversibility

• Medium
  • Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used.

Risk of termination shock

• Medium
  • A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
    • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

Physical and chemical changes

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice.
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate.

Impacts on species

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on ecosystems

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations"). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on society

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait).
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

Ease of reversibility

• Medium
  • Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used.

Risk of termination shock

• Medium
  • A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
    • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

Physical and chemical changes

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice.
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate.

Impacts on species

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on ecosystems

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations"). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

Impacts on society

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait).
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

Ease of reversibility

• Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used.

Risk of termination shock

• A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
  • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice.
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate.

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species.
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations"). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait).
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

• Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used.

• A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
  • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations"). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait)
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

• Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used

• A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
  • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations").
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see "Governance considerations"). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations"), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait)
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see "Governance considerations") that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

• Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used

• A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
  • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

• Co-benefits
  • Accumulation of ice may lower temperatures and facilitate growth of new ice
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a risk depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Potential strengthening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Increased export of sea ice in the Fram Strait in the past was associated with weakening of AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
• Risks
  • May alter ocean circulation if stratification patterns are changed; this could also be a co-benefit depending on the direction and magnitude of change.
  • Aerosols from ships or other infrastructure needed for this technology could impact the local climate

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species
• Risks
  • If a structure is used to block ice export, may impact movements of Arctic species
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ice-associated species south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Increase in sea ice extent in the Arctic may benefit sea ice associated species
  • Blocking sea ice export in Nares Strait could potentially facilitate stable ice conditions required for ice arch formation that may help to maintain Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see governance considerations).
• Risks
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, a polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice) with ecological importance (see governance considerations). It is an area that experiences upwelling and has high productivity. It is unknown if changing patterns of sea ice export could impact the polynya.
  • Blocking ice export may negatively impact ecosystems south of the blockage that depend on drift ice.

• Co-benefits
  • Within the Nares Strait, the ice arch is an important area for people for traveling (ICC 2017) and stabilizing the ice arch may benefit travel.
  • Potential for restoration and maintenance of Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see governance considerations), facilitating biological productivity of hunting grounds and maintaining the ability to travel across the polynya.
• Risks
  • Blocking an area could impact movement of people (likely more of a risk in the Nares Strait compared to the Fram Strait)
  • Nares Strait is nearby Sarvarjuaq / Pikialasorsuaq, polynya (an area of year-round open water surrounded by sea ice; see governance considerations) that Inuit communities from Canada and Greenland rely on.
  • Materials and infrastructure used to create the barrier could disturb the area and impact access.

• Removing the device blocking export would resume export of sea ice, but the ease of removal is unknown and depends on the method and mechanism used

• A sudden export of sea ice may occur after the blocking device is removed. In the past, increases in sea ice export and freshening of surface waters have weakened the AMOC (Ionita et al. 2016).
  • Atmospheric flow patterns play a role in sea ice dynamics. In previous periods in the Arctic when there was reduced winds, there was lower sea ice export in the Fram Strait and accumulation of sea ice (Ionita et al. 2016). As winds increased, sea ice export through the Fram Strait was enhanced, leading to enhanced freshwater input in the area that weakened the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) via decrease in salinity in Labrador Sea.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
  • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.
• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability – Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership, and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
  • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.
• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability – Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership, and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
  • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.

• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability – Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership, and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
  • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.

• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability – Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership, and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
  • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.

• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability - Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
  • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.

• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability - Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
  • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (7).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.

• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability - Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • For all Ice Management approaches, research and testing could be done within national jurisdiction (territorial seas or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs); note that different legal rules apply to territorial seas and EEZs). Scalability may require deployment to additional areas within international waters.  See “Existing governance” for other available information on relevant governance structures.
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • National jurisdiction, as the actual structure blocking ice export is likely to happen within territorial or EEZ waters. However, the blocking of sea ice could have transboundary effects. For the Fram Strait, Greenland would have jurisdiction. Nares Strait is located between Canada and Greenland.
  • If the structure blocking ice export was placed outside of Greenland’s EEZ, it would be in international waters.
  • If barriers to prevent ice export impede navigation through the EEZ or high seas, then this would raise issues under UNCLOS.  Actions on the high seas must be taken with due regard to the rights of other states, including freedom of navigation.

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The Arctic Ocean is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which includes all Arctic coastal states except the United States. The United States, however, is bound to customary law “including customs codified or that have emerged from UNCLOS” (Argüello and Johansson 2022).
    • UNCLOS and marine scientific research (MSR):
      • MSR is governed by Part XIII of UNCLOS. In general, the right of states to conduct MSR is subject to the rights and duties of other states under UNCLOS (UNCLOS Article 238). There is a duty on parties to promote and facilitate MSR (UNCLOS Article 239).
      • MSR shall be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, it may not unjustifiably interfere with other legitimate uses of the sea, and it must be conducted in compliance with all relevant regulations adopted in conformity with the Convention, including those for the protection and preservation of the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 240).
      • States are responsible and liable for damage caused by pollution of the marine environment arising out of MSR undertaken by them or on their behalf (UNCLOS Article 263(3)).
        • Any approaches that involve adding material or energy to the ocean that would cause or be likely to cause damage to the marine environment would constitute “pollution of the marine environment” within the meaning of Article 1(1)(4) of UNCLOS, and States would have a duty to minimize the pollution pursuant to Article 194.
      • National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • In a coastal state’s territorial sea (12 nautical miles from shore baseline), the coastal state has the exclusive right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR.
        • In a coastal state’s EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore baseline), coastal states also have the right to regulate, authorize, and conduct MSR, and MSR by other states requires the consent of the coastal state (UNCLOS Article 246(2)). States ordinarily give their consent, and they are required to adopt rules to ensure that consent is not delayed or denied unreasonably. UNCLOS further specifies grounds for refusing consent, including if the MSR involves introducing harmful substances into the marine environment (UNCLOS Article 246(5)(b)).
      • Areas outside National Jurisdiction and MSR under UNCLOS
        • On the high seas, UNCLOS provides for freedom of MSR (UNCLOS Article 87(1)(f)), but it must be done with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas (Articles 87(2)).
        • The high seas are reserved for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and no state may subject a portion of high seas to its sovereignty (Article 89).
      • The 2017 Agreement on Enhancing Arctic Scientific Cooperation is relevant. This is a legally binding agreement signed in 2017 by all Arctic States negotiated in the Arctic Council. It promotes international cooperation and favorable conditions for conducting scientific research, facilitates access to research areas, infrastructure, and facilities, and promotes education and training of scientists in Arctic issues. The agreement also encourages participants to utilize traditional and local knowledge as appropriate as well as encourages communication between traditional and local knowledge holders and participants. This may provide a framework for consultation with stakeholders including Indigenous peoples in intervention research, planning, and testing (Chuffart et al. 2023).
      • The Arctic Council has been called upon as a venue for providing oversight on approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, or to establish working groups to provide guidance (Bodansky and Hunt 2020, Bennett et al. 2022). If the objective of the approach is to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice, rather than altering global temperatures, the Arctic parties have the primary interest (Bodansky and Hunt 2020). However, the current geopolitical landscape and lack of participation from Russia makes consensus difficult.
      • See Argüello and Johansson (2022) for further details of governance related to ice management.
    • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
      • There is currently no legal status for ice. See discussion on iceberg sovereignty by Wood-Donnelly (2022).
      • For Nares Strait area, the governments of Canada and Greenland signed a letter of intent for cooperation in management of Pikialasorsuaq. This LOI is in line with the 2017 Pikialasorsuaq Commission report that recommends establishing an Inuit-led management plan for the area. There are many governance structures in the area that must work together to manage the area, including in Canada the Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., the Government of Nunavut, and the Government of Canada, and in Greenland with KNAPK, municipalities in Greenland, the Inuit Circumpolar Council Greenland, and the Government of Greenland (7).

• Here we define justice related to approaches to slow the loss of Arctic sea ice through distributive justice, procedural justice, and restorative justice. Following COMEST (2023), we consider questions of ethics through a justice lens. Note that this is not an exhaustive list of justice dimensions and as the field advances, so will the related considerations and dimensions.

• Distributive justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If distributive justice is considered, the objective would be that benefits and costs of research or potential deployment of the approach be distributed fairly while protecting the basic rights of the most vulnerable.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • Blocking ice export in targeted areas would prevent ice from entering areas south of the blockage, thereby redistributing the potential costs and benefits of that ice. Reinforcing a natural structure that blocks ice export, such as in Nares Strait, may potentially restore ice strength and benefit communities that depend on the ice bridge, however those benefits need to be weighed against the cost to downstream communities that will lose drift ice. The lack of framework for the legal status of ice makes rights of coastal communities difficult to protect (Wood-Donnelly 2022).
• Procedural justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If procedural justice is considered, people affected by research would have an opportunity to participate and have a say in how the approach will be researched, deployed, and governed.
    • Bennett et al. (2022) suggests an inclusive governance approach that incorporates stakeholder concerns in the design and deployment of approaches and effectively communicates risk. Within the development of such a framework there is an opportunity to prioritize Indigenous self-determination and procedural justice (Chuffart et al. 2023). Note, however, that stakeholders may also include non-local people.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.
• Restorative justice
  • Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
    • If restorative justice is considered, plans would be developed for those who could be harmed by the approach to be compensated, rehabilitated, or restored.
  • Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
    • No additional information.

• Unknown

• Applicable to all approaches within Ice Management:
  • The principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) is the foundation for engagement with Indigenous Peoples.
  • Particular to any potential Arctic research or deployment, The Inuit Circumpolar Council (2022) has published Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement, which include eight protocols:
    • ‘Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
    • Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
    • Practice Good Governance
    • Communication with Intent
    • Exercising Accountability - Building Trust
    • Building Meaningful Partnerships
    • Information, Data Sharing, Ownership and Permissions
    • Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge
  • Any meaningful engagement with Indigenous peoples needs to consider context. Whyte (2018) states, “Indigenous voices should be involved in scientific and policy discussions of different types of geoengineering. But, context matters. Geoengineering discourses cannot just be associated with geoengineering to the exclusion of topics and solutions that Indigenous peoples value.”
• Specific to Blocking Ice Export:
  • Unknown, likely none
    • The area in Nares Strait which may be successful in blocking sea ice export is an important area to Indigenous peoples. There are well-developed existing governance structures in this area (see ICC 2017). Communities who live in this region are best positioned to manage the region through an Inuit Management Authority led by Inuit from Canada and Greenland (ICC 2017).